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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The primary issue in this appeal concerns a dispute over 
the interpretation and compliance with two wor ds -- "best 
efforts" -- in a comprehensive written agreement between 
two sophisticated business entities, an insurance agency 
and its underwriter. George N. Pegula Agency ("Agency"), 
CGA Management Corporation ("Management"), George 
Pegula ("Pegula"), Barbara Pegula, and Monumental Life 
Insurance Company ("Monumental") enter ed into an asset 
and restructuring agreement on December 30, 1993 
("Agreement").1 Agency brought an action in 1995 in a state 
court against Monumental which was removed to the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania alleging a breach of the Agr eement. Agency 
claimed that Monumental failed to use its "best efforts" to 
market insurance programs to Catholic Golden Age ("CGA") 
members. CGA is an organization of senior citizens who are 
Catholic. After a six-day non-jury trial, the District Court 
held that Agency did not prove that Monumental failed to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. When referred to together, George and Barbara Pegula will be referred 
to as "The Pegulas." 
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satisfy its obligations under the Agreement. The District 
Court, additionally holding that Pegula wilfully br eached 
the Agreement, imposed personal liability on the Pegulas 
under the terms of the Agreement. Agency and the Pegulas 
were ordered to pay $9,112,760 plus interest of $80,053, 
costs of suit, and attorneys' fees of $888,048. 
 
Agency timely filed post-trial motions under Fed. R. Civ. 
Proc. 52 and 59 challenging the District Court's findings, 
and moved to disqualify the trial judge under 28 U.S.C. 
S 455(a). After hearing the recusal motion, the District 
Court denied it. The Court subsequently denied all of 
Agency's post-trial motions, except that it vacated its 
finding of personal liability against Geor ge and Barbara 
Pegula. On April 20, 2000, Agency and Managementfiled 
petitions under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. On 
November 29, 2000, during the pendency of this appeal, 
Agency and Management moved this court to substitute 
John J. Martin, Trustee in Bankruptcy, as party in interest 
and to amend the caption accordingly.2 We granted the 
motion. 
 
Agency appealed the District Court's judgment with 
respect to the interpretation and operation of the "best 
efforts" provision in the Agreement and challenges the 
judge's refusal to recuse himself. Monumental General 
Insurance Group, Inc. timely cross-appealed the District 
Court's reconsidered ruling that the Pegulas did not wilfully 
breach the Agreement. We affir m the judgment of the 
District Court in favor of Monumental and affir m the 
judgment of the District Court in favor of Geor ge and 
Barbara Pegula.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This opinion, to the extent it attributes ar guments and contentions to 
Agency and/or Management, is actually referring to arguments 
considered to have been raised by the T rustee. 
 
3. Subject matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. S 1332. The amount 
in controversy exceeds $75,000. Plaintif fs/counterclaim-defendants are 
Pennsylvania corporations with principal places of business in 
Pennsylvania or are residents of Pennsylvania. See Appx. 5. Defendants/ 
counterclaim-plaintiffs are corporations incorporated in or with principal 
places of business located in states other than Pennsylvania. See id. We 
have appellate jurisdiction because the appellant and cross-appellant 
have timely appealed from a final judgment of the District Court. 
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I. 
 
Neither party contests the District Court's findings of 
fact, so they are the best source of the history of the 
dispute before us. 
 
A. Breach of Contract 
 
       1. Background 
 
Catholic Golden Age ("CGA") is a non-pr ofit Pennsylvania 
corporation offering various benefits to its members, senior 
citizens of the Catholic faith primarily over 60 years old. 
One of CGA's popular benefits is the opportunity to 
purchase various types of health and life insurance. Pegula 
was instrumental in establishing CGA, and is listed on its 
letterhead as "founder." 
 
As Agency's counsel explained at oral argument, CGA 
itself had no employees, only a Board of Dir ectors (advised 
by Pegula) and attorneys representing its interests. CGA is 
essentially a shell that is run by Management, which is 
owned by Pegula. By written agreement dated November 4, 
1976, CGA appointed Agency as its exclusive agent to 
market and administer insurance products to CGA 
members, including billing and collecting pr emiums. CGA 
also gave Management the exclusive right to of fer non- 
insurance services to CGA members. Management assumed 
responsibility for developing membership in CGA and for 
managing its day-to-day affairs. Between 1976 and 1993, 
Agency marketed to CGA members health insurance 
products including Medicare Supplement ("Med Supp"), 
hospital indemnity, major illness, home health car e, cancer 
and skilled nursing coverage, and whole life insurance. 
Agency created all of the promotional material stating that 
CGA was the sponsor. There was a dir ect relationship 
between Agency's sales of insurance products to CGA 
members and Management's success in enrolling new CGA 
members. Agency's sales to CGA members peaked in 1986, 
when insurance premiums for new policies totaled almost 
$3.7 million. 
 
Agency's fortunes decreased dramatically in the early 
1990's as sales of new insurance failed to materialize. 
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Between 1990 and 1993, the annual premiums paid to 
Agency shrank over one third, from $956,581 to $597,257, 
due in large part to the aging CGA membership. Agency 
commission income declined accordingly. A 1990 federal 
law limiting the portion of each Med Supp pr emium dollar 
available for payment of overhead expenses, marketing, and 
agent commissions also contributed to Agency's financial 
difficulties. 
 
Beginning in the early 1980's, Monumental underwr ote 
the insurance products marketed and administer ed by 
Agency. During the 1980's, Agency incurred substantial 
debt to Barclays American Business Credit, Inc. ("Barclays") 
and to Monumental. In 1988, Monumental, Barclays, 
Agency, and Pegula restructured theirfinancial 
relationships. As of October 18, 1988, Agency owed 
Monumental approximately $3.4 million. Agency defaulted 
in 1992 and 1993, so in October, 1993, Monumental, 
Barclays, Agency, Pegula, and Management enter ed a 
Memorandum of Understanding. Immediately prior to 
entering this Memorandum of Understanding, Monumental 
purchased Barclays's note, becoming the sole principal 
creditor of Agency with a total obligation outstanding of 
over $8.2 million. On December 30, 1993, the r estructuring 
Agreement, which is at issue on this appeal, was executed. 
The Agreement replaced the Memorandum of 
Understanding. 
 
       2. 1993 Agreement 
 
Only the provisions of the December, 1993 Agreement 
relevant to this appeal are stated her e. The Agreement 
restructured Agency's debt obligations, conditionally 
relieved George and Barbara Pegula of personal liability for 
the Agency's outstanding debt obligation, made Agency 
responsible for marketing CGA membership, and assigned 
to Monumental the administration and marketing of its 
insurance products to CGA members. Agency and 
Management (both controlled by George Pegula) agreed to 
diligently use their respective best ef forts to market CGA 
memberships. Agency was required to obtain 20,000 new 
CGA members by December 31, 1994; 30,000 new CGA 
members by December 31, 1995; and 40,000 new CGA 
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members for each of years 1996, 1997, and 1998. Failure 
to generate the required new CGA members constituted an 
"Event of Default" under the Agreement; Monumental's 
relief was limited to retention of commissions payable to 
Agency. 
 
The Agreement required Pegula to cr eate a fund devoted 
"exclusively for marketing purposes to obtain new members 
for CGA;" he was required to "use best efforts to initially 
establish the Fund before March, 1994. Agency was 
required to provide Monumental with a written marketing 
plan by December 1 of each year; the plan had to pr oject 
cost breakdowns, marketing objectives, and a pr o forma 
detailed accounting of projected membership development 
expenses and revenues. Pegula's deliberate failure to 
prepare the required plan was deemed an "Event of 
Default." 
 
Under S 1.01 of the Agreement, Agency ceded to 
Monumental the marketing of "[t]he curr ent CGA Life and 
Health Insurance programs underwritten by [Monumental] 
or any of its affiliates." Appx. 1473. S 1.01 continues: 
 
       Provided that [Monumental] and/or any of its affiliates 
       is/are licensed in all of the states in which it is 
       determined by [Monumental] and CGA that products 
       are to be marketed . . . to CGA members, 
       [Monumental] shall underwrite and be r esponsible for 
       all new marketing of existing CGA insurance pr ograms 
       and will underwrite and market all new Life and Health 
       Insurance programs, as well as annuity pr ograms to be 
       made available to CGA members. [Monumental] agrees 
       to use its best efforts to actively market insurance and 
       annuities (where agreed upon by CGA and 
       [Monumental]) to the CGA members. 
 
       *** 
 
       If it is determined by [Monumental] that a particular 
       form of Life, Health, or Annuity product will not be 
       underwritten by [Monumental] or any one of its 
       affiliates after receiving a request fr om CGA to offer 
       such a product, Agency shall then be per mitted to 
       place that particular insurance program, as to that 
       benefit and product structure, with another insurance 
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       company. . . . If [Monumental] deter mines that it or any 
       of its affiliates will underwrite and offer a new product, 
       [Monumental] shall use its best ef forts to offer such 
       product to substantially all CGA members located in 
       each state where the product is appr oved by the 
       appropriate governmental authorities. (emphasis 
       added) 
 
The Agreement relieves George and Barbara Pegula from 
personal liability for the loan balances owing Monumental, 
provided that the Pegulas did not engage in fraud, wilful or 
wanton misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance, or 
deliberate subversion of the intent of the Agr eement. 
 
3. Insurance Economics4 
 
The price of any insurance product must first cover the 
amount the insurance company must pay to its insur eds 
based on the claims received. For Med Supp insurance, 
75% of the premiums for such policies must cover claims or 
the difference between 75% and the claims cost must be 
refunded to insureds in subsequent years. If a company's 
claims cost exceeds 75%, there is no mechanism for an 
insurance company to recover that additional percentage; 
the insurer's profit margin is r educed. Insurance companies 
use a ratio called TAP:MC to price insurance pr oducts and 
to evaluate whether their marketing activities ar e 
successful. TAP represents total annualized premium; MC 
represents marketing costs. Monumental's T AP:MC goal for 
Med Supp for CGA was 9:1; for other products it ranged 
from 1.5:1 to 2.5:1. 9:1 was a reasonable TAP:MC goal. The 
lower the response rate for a particular mailing or 
marketing campaign, the fewer policies are issued, and 
each policy must cover a higher percentage of the 
marketing costs. In creating and implementing a marketing 
campaign, Agency never used the TAP:MC ratio to 
determine cost-effectiveness. 
 
To market an insurance product in a state, an insurance 
company must be licensed to market insurance in that 
state, the product must be approved by the state, and, in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We attribute our information on insurance economics to the analysis 
of the subject by the District Court. See Appx. 18-21. 
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some states, the approval of the group to which the 
company sells must also be obtained. In 1993, Monumental 
was licensed to sell insurance in all states, but it could not 
market Med Supp in two states. Monumental maintains a 
"Contracts and Compliance Department" r esponsible for 
obtaining product approval in all states. 
 
For various reasons, Monumental did not of fer insurance 
products to individuals over 80 years of age. Accordingly, 
approximately 25% of the CGA membership consisted of 
individuals to whom Monumental had no product to 
market. 
 
       4. Monumental's & Agency's Marketing Ef forts and 
       Results 
 
In 1994, Monumental developed and tested special 
creative kits for CGA for some of its pr oducts (not Med 
Supp), tested telemarketing on Med Supp coverage, and 
conducted direct mail marketing for all pr oducts other than 
its Accident, Death & Dismemberment, HIP , and skilled 
nursing products. Monumental mailed 96,950 marketing 
pieces to CGA active and inactive members. Monumental 
spent $96,679 marketing insurance programs to CGA 
members; it received $275,563 in insurance policy 
premiums from CGA members. Agency was paid 
$23,327.95 in commissions from new business generated 
by Monumental. Agency met its obligation of enr olling at 
least 20,000 members in 1994. 
 
In 1995, Monumental contracted with an outside entity 
to create a new insurance solicitation kit. The kit failed, 
however, and was abandoned. Agency failed to meet its 
required enrollment goal of 30,000 new CGA members. 
Monumental mailed 233,849 marketing pieces to CGA 
members. Monumental spent $178,348 in marketing 
insurance programs to CGA members; it sold $276,171 in 
insurance policy premiums and paid Agency $23,576.73 in 
commission. 
 
In 1996, Monumental tested a gender specific cancer 
insurance product, marketed a more af fordable Med Supp 
product to an expanded age bracket, and experimented 
with a Family Care Product. In that year , Monumental 
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mailed 117,637 marketing pieces to CGA members, 
spending $69,316. Monumental earned $152,403 in 
insurance premiums from CGA members and, determining 
that Agency breached the Agreement in failing to reach the 
agreed-upon CGA membership goals, retained all Agency 
commissions. 
 
       5. Other Facts Relevant to Agency's Br each 
 
Between 1993 and 1995, Monumental negotiated 
advertising rates in the CGA World Magazine. An agreement 
could never be reached because CGA wanted over $4,000 
for advertisements normally costing Monumental $1,800. 
Monumental never advertised its products in the CGA 
magazine. 
 
In 1994, Pegula expressed an interest in telemarketing 
Med Supp, Monumental responded that it would pursue 
expansion of its current efforts if Pegula proved that his 
past efforts had been successful. Pegula did not produce 
the requested information after r epeated requests. 
 
Pegula never created the $200,000 marketing fund 
required under the Agreement. In 1994, the only year that 
Agency met its member recruitment requir ement under the 
Agreement, it spent more to achieve the new members than 
it received in dues. When Agency proposed its membership 
plan for 1995, it projected that expenses would again 
exceed dues revenue. Upon questioning, Agency defended 
the propriety of membership development not being 
economically self-sufficient. Because Agency'sfinances were 
so poor and the 1994 membership marketing plan very 
costly, Agency did not have the funds to conduct the 1995 
membership marketing campaign. Agency also failed to 
conduct any membership marketing effort in 1996, neither 
did it meet the minimum of 30,000 new CGA members 
required of it in 1995, or meet the minimum of 40,000 new 
CGA members in 1996. 
 
Agency's failure to submit a membership development 
plan when due, or to submit a marketing plan that could 
withstand reasonable objection by Monumental, also was 
held to constitute breach of the Agreement. Monumental 
rejected the 1995 marketing plan. The District Court found 
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other breaches of the Agreement by Pegula and Agency not 
directly relevant to this appeal. 
 
       6. Monumental's Performance 
 
Between 1993 and 1996, Monumental worked to obtain 
approval for its products in all states. It expended money 
for new marketing solicitations for CGA, often employing 
marketing experts. It marketed insurance products for CGA 
that it did not offer for other associations. Monumental 
instituted an expensive computer system that personalized 
Med Supp insurance solicitations and employed an 
experienced telemarketer to market Med Supp insurance to 
CGA members. Monumental changed its affiliates so it 
could offer cheaper Med Supp insurance. It of fered to use 
Pegula's suggested telemarketing strategy if Pegula offered 
evidence that it had been successful, and pr ovided input 
into Agency's marketing plans, including suggesting that 
Agency target new memberships in states wher e there was 
no large CGA membership and where Agency had not 
previously marketed insurance. 
 
Though Agency does not appeal any of the District 
Court's findings of fact, it sets forth many examples of 
Monumental's deficient performance. Agency's contentions 
cannot be taken seriously because it has not appealed any 
of the Court's findings of fact. We owe gr eat deference to 
findings of fact not challenged on appeal. Appellant's brief 
spends time trying to convince us of the unr easonableness 
of the District Court's findings without having challenged 
their accuracy or validity on appeal. 
 
B. Recusal 
 
Four months before the plaintiffs filed this action, CGA 
filed a similar action against Monumental concer ning the 
Agreement. See Catholic Golden Age v. Monumental Life Ins. 
Co., 95-CV-1359 ("CGA Action" or"CGA"). CGA's complaint 
involved the same principals, witnesses, insurance 
products, and trial judge as are involved in the instant 
case. Attorney George Clark repr esented CGA; Attorney 
James J. Rodgers ("Rodgers"), of Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish & 
Kauffman ("Dilworth"), repr esented Monumental. After 
being assigned the CGA action, the trial judge on August 
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22, 1995 sua sponte informed the parties that he had been 
affiliated with the Dilworth firm as an associate from 1983 
through 1986, and as a partner from 1986 through 1992. 
The judge had joined Dilworth at the same time as had 
Attorney Rodgers; in 1986 they both had become partners. 
The judge worked for the firm in the Scranton office; 
Rodgers worked in its Philadelphia office. In 1992, the 
judge terminated his association with Dilworth; his 
financial arrangements with the firm ceased in October 
1994, and he had never represented Monumental during 
his affiliation with Dilworth. The judge explained that his 
disqualification "may be appropriate based on an 
appearance of partiality," but informed the parties that if 
they desired to waive the ground for disqualification, they 
could. All parties filed timely written waivers with the Clerk 
of Court and Judge Vanaskie continued to pr eside over the 
CGA litigation. 
 
On December 29, 1995, Monumental removed the instant 
action from the state court to the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Because of its 
relationship to the CGA action, this case was assigned to 
Judge Vanaskie. The first conference between the judge and 
counsel was held on March 19, 1996 by telephone. 
Lawrence M. Ludwig ("Ludwig"), counsel for Agency, and 
James J. Rodgers from Dilworth, counsel for Monumental, 
participated. It is disputed whether in that confer ence the 
district judge advised counsel of his potential conflict; 
Judge Vanaskie and Rodgers claim that disclosure was 
made and oral waivers obtained. Counsel for Agency claims 
disclosure was not made. Neither the Case Management 
Order nor the docket entries reflect any disqualification in 
the underlying action. Nor do Ludwig's notes of the March 
19, 1996 conference call record a disqualification 
discussion. Counsel for Agency claims that he did not know 
that Judge Vanaskie conditionally disqualified himself in 
CGA until after the trial in this case, when Judge Vanaskie 
held a conference call on January 4, 1999, to schedule a 
hearing in response to Agency's Rule 59 post-trial motion 
for disqualification.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Before claiming to know about the conditional disqualification in CGA, 
counsel for Agency based their recusal motion on, inter alia, the district 
judge's purportedly undisclosed personal relationship with Rodgers. 
Such a relationship is denied by Rodgers and the district judge. See 
Appx. at 74. 
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It appears undisputed that Barbara Pegula Verrastro, 
Pegula's daughter, was corporate designee of CGA during 
the CGA litigation. Ludwig represented CGA during the 
settlement negotiations and depositions in the CGA 
litigation. It is also undisputed that the CGA action arose 
out of the same 1993 Agreement as the instant action, and 
that CGA, Agency, and Pegula are inter-r elated entities -- 
Pegula is the founder of and advisor to CGA and is a 
principal of the Agency. Judge Vanaskie made full 
disclosure in the CGA action of his past association with 
the Dilworth firm and its termination, and Pegula and 
Ludwig knew of Judge Vanaskie's participation in the CGA 
action. 
 
Counsel for Agency disclosed at oral argument before this 
court that CGA is essentially a shell corporation with a 
Board of Directors and attorneys. CGA is essentially 
operated by Management. For example, it appears fr om the 
record that Pegula was a requir ed attendee at the 
settlement conferences in CGA, even though neither he nor 
Agency were parties in the action. 
 
II. 
 
There are three issues on appeal: 1) whether the District 
Court committed reversible error in excluding parol 
evidence of Agency's understanding of "best ef forts" in the 
Agreement; 2) whether the District Court violated the 
recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. S 455; and 3) whether the 
District Court erred in vacating the portion of its judgment 
that had imposed personal liability on George and Barbara 
Pegula for Agency's contractual damages. First, however, we 
turn to the consequences of Agency's and Management's 
recent bankruptcy filings. 
 
A. Agency and Management Bankruptcy 
 
On April 20, 2000, Agency and Management filed 
petitions for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
The right to appeal is part of the debtors' estates. See 11 
U.S.C. S 541(a). Only Agency's and Management's trustee 
can pursue their appeals unless the trustee has abandoned 
the appeals. See 11 U.S.C. S 554(a). On December 1, the 
trustee, John Martin, Esquire, moved for substitution to 
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pursue the appeal and amendment to the caption of the 
case. We granted the motion. Therefor e, the appeal is not 
abandoned and we proceed to the merits. 
 
B. "Best Efforts" 
 
The District Court excluded extrinsic evidence of the 
parties' understanding of the extent of Monumental's 
obligation to use its best efforts to market its insurance 
products to the CGA membership. The court r endered its 
decision, making findings of fact and conclusions of law 
without reference to evidence of contemporary facts or 
discussions concerning the parties' understanding of "best 
efforts" when the Agreement was enter ed. 
 
The District Court's interpretation of contract law, i.e., 
the admissibility of parol or extrinsic evidence, or whether 
the contract is ambiguous, receives plenary r eview. See 
Sumitomo Machinery Corp. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 81 F.3d 
328, 332 (3d Cir. 1996); Commonwealth Dept. of Transp. v. 
E-Z Parks, 620 A.2d 712, 717 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). Where a 
party makes known the substance of the evidence it desires 
to introduce, we review the District Court's decision to 
exclude the evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Narin 
v. Lower Merion School Dist., 206 F.3d 323, 334 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
 
In interpreting a contract, a court must first consider the 
intent of the parties as expressed in the wor ds used in the 
agreement. See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, 
619 F.2d 1001, 1009 (3d Cir. 1980). If parties have 
integrated their agreement into a single written memorial, 
all prior negotiations and agreements in r egard to the same 
subject matter, whether oral or written, ar e excluded from 
consideration. See Nicolella v. Palmer, 432 Pa. 502 (1968). 
Parol evidence is excluded to preserve the integrity of 
written agreements by refusing to per mit the contracting 
parties' attempt to change the meaning of the contract 
through the use of "extraneous infor mation." See In re: 
Columbia Gas System, Inc., 50 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 1995). 
When a written contract is clear and unequivocal, its 
meaning must be determined by its contents alone. See 
Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1010 (citing East Crossroads 
Center, Inc. v. Mellon-Stuart Co., 416 Pa. 229, 230 (1965)). 
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Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous 
with the adoption of a writing are admissible, however, to 
establish the meaning of ambiguous terms in the writing, 
whether or not the writing is integrated. See Mellon Bank, 
619 F.2d at 1011; Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax 
Dev. Corp., 908 F.2d 1363, 1373 (7th Cir . 1990) (inquiry 
into preliminary discussions precluded unless necessary to 
"disambiguate" the contract); Proteus Books, Ltd. v. Cherry 
Lane Music Co., 873 F.2d 502, 509-10 (2d Cir.1989); 11 
Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts S 33:23 (4th ed. 
1999). If the contract terms are ambiguous or incomplete, 
and extrinsic evidence is examined, interpretation of the 
contract becomes a question of fact, unless the extrinsic 
evidence is conclusive. See In re Minnesota Power & Light 
Company, 435 N.W.2d 550, 563 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 
A term is ambiguous if it can have two or mor e 
reasonable meanings. See Sumitomo, 81 F .3d at 332; Mellon 
Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011. "If a r easonable alternative 
interpretation is suggested, even though it may be alien to 
the judge's linguistic experience, objective evidence in 
support of that interpretation should be considered by the 
fact finder." Mellon Bank, 619 F .2d at 1011. In determining 
whether a contract term is ambiguous, we must consider 
the actual words of the agreement, as well as alternative 
meanings offered by counsel, and extrinsic evidence offered 
in support of those alternative meanings. See St. Paul Fire 
and Marine Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 935 F.2d 1428, 1431 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 
"Best efforts" has been widely held to be an ambiguous 
contract term. See, e.g., U.S. Airways Group, Inc. v. British 
Airways PLC, 989 F. Supp. 482, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Grant 
v. Board of Educ., 668 N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. App. 1996). In U.S. 
Airways, the court explained that under New Y ork law, "to 
the extent that the term `best efforts' . . . is ambiguous, and 
criteria by which to measure the parties' `best efforts' are 
lacking, the extrinsic circumstances concer ning the parties' 
understanding of that term may be consider ed by the finder 
of fact." U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 989 F. Supp. at 491. 
"Best efforts" depends on the factual circumstances 
surrounding an agreement. See T riple-A Baseball Club 
Assocs v. Northeastern Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214, 225 
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(1st Cir. 1987). However, in Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson 
Wax Dev. Corp., 908 F.2d 1363, 1373 (7th Cir. 1990), the 
court reasoned that a "best efforts" clause in a contract 
with an integration clause could not be illuminated by parol 
evidence. The Olympia court stated that" `best efforts' is a 
familiar [term] in contract parlance, and its meaning is 
especially plain in a case such as this wher e the promisor 
has similar contracts with other promisees. In such a case 
`best efforts' means the efforts the promisor has employed 
in those parallel contracts where the adequacy of his efforts 
have not been questioned." Id. at 1373. 
 
In this case, the District Court concluded that 
Monumental exercised its best efforts to market its 
products to the CGA membership, reasoning that 
Monumental exercised its business judgment to decide to 
which CGA members it would market. The District Court 
defined "best efforts" by refer ence to good faith and sound 
business judgment. By excluding Agency's offer of extrinsic 
evidence, the District Court concluded that "best efforts" 
was not ambiguous and could be construed by r eference to 
case law and surrounding facts. The District Court held 
that Monumental exercised its best business judgment in 
its marketing in the face of Agency's default. Monumental 
telemarketed and hired consultants even when their results 
were disappointing, and expended "substantial" amounts 
on marketing in a "diligent and consistent" ef fort to uphold 
its end of the bargain. To the extent Monumental got off to 
a slow start in 1993, the District Court reasoned that 
Agency's slow provision of CGA membership lists 
contributed at least in part to the delay. 
 
Agency argues it would have produced extrinsic evidence 
showing that Monumental promised the following before the 
written Agreement was executed: 1) Dave Rutkowski of 
Monumental met with Pegula on or about August 31, 1993 
and stated that Monumental's efforts at marketing 
insurance products to CGA members would r esult in 
significant new commissions and at least $600,000 in 
renewal commissions to Agency in the first year; 2) on or 
about September 22, Micky Feldman, attorney for 
Monumental, represented that Monumental would advertise 
in "CGA World" magazine as much as or more than Pegula 
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had done in the past, and that Monumental would spend 
substantial sums to build insurance sales to CGA 
members; 3) in conversations between September and 
December, 1993, Paul Latchford of Monumental assured 
Pegula that approvals in "no sell" states would be 
aggressively sought, and that Monumental's marketing 
efforts would be aggressive in all states; 4) On October 22, 
1993, Latchford and Don Loren of Monumental told Pegula 
that Monumental had a new marketing campaign to 
aggressively market products in all states; and 5) at an 
October 18, 1993 meeting, Latchford insisted that 
Monumental was capable of maintaining the same 
marketing level Pegula had maintained. 
 
Agency also claims that a Monumental officer said 
Monumental could do much more business than Agency 
because it was licensed to sell in all states and had 
marketing expertise. Agency also claims it was pr epared to 
offer evidence of Monumental's acknowledgment of an 
obligation to market to all CGA members, not just members 
that could meet its profit goals.6  None of Agency's 
evidentiary offerings suggest that Monumental bound itself 
to invest in marketing efforts it knew would be unprofitable. 
Nor do Agency's offerings, taken as true, upset the District 
Court's conclusions of law. 
 
The Agreement was fully integrated. The Agr eement also 
contained a provision stating that "[i]n the event of any 
inconsistency between this Agreement and those prior 
agreements, this Agreement shall contr ol and any 
inconsistent terms or provisions in those prior agreements 
shall be deemed null and void." Section 1.01 of the 
Agreement is unambiguous, based on a reasonable reading 
of the Agreement in the context of the surr ounding facts 
and circumstances. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Agency also argues that the Memorandum of Understanding required 
Monumental to market to all CGA members. But the Agr eement does not 
retain the term "all, " and S 5.04 of the Agreement states that "[i]n the 
event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and those prior 
agreements, this Agreement shall contr ol and any inconsistent terms or 
provisions in those prior agreements shall be deemed null and void." 
Agency's reliance on the Memorandum of Understanding is misplaced. 
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Precedent treats "best efforts" as a form of good faith and 
sound business judgment. See National Data Payment 
Systems v. Meridian Bank, 212 F.3d 849, 854 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(considering "best efforts" in the context of appellee's sale of 
a business to appellant, and holding that it r equires 
diligence and an elevated duty of good faith). The District 
Court's holding in the instant case that Monumental 
exercised sound business judgment, diligence, and good 
faith is supported by the record. Agency and Pegula did not 
define "best efforts" to state clearly Monumental's 
marketing obligation; in the absence of such a definition, 
the District Court's interpretation of the ter m is consistent 
with the surrounding facts and circumstances of the 
Agreement. 
 
Section 1.01 frequently states "If Monumental 
determines," implying that there is an element of discretion 
in Monumental's duty to market to CGA members. "Best 
efforts" is a dynamic notion. Monumental's best efforts in 
1993 were certainly changed when Congress amended the 
laws concerning Med Supp insurance. No r easonable 
reading of "best efforts" compels Monumental to market to 
all, or even to substantially all of the CGA members, 
regardless of age. Monumental did not compromise its right 
to exercise sound business judgment in its marketing 
programs. Its efforts, from working to obtain approval for 
its products in all fifty states to substantial investment in 
computers and marketing consultants, but constrained by 
targeted TAP:MC ratios, evince good faith, fair dealing, and 
diligence. The District Court properly r ejected extrinsic 
evidence of the parties' intent. 
 
Even if the District Court had erred as a matter of law by 
not admitting extrinsic evidence of the parties' intended 
meaning of "best efforts," the err or would have been 
harmless. Under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 61,"[n]o error in . . . the 
exclusion of evidence . . . is ground for granting a new trial 
or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or 
otherwise distributing a judgment or order , unless refusal 
to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with 
substantial justice." The District Court issued a careful and 
thorough 64-page decision; none of its 231findings of fact 
were contested on appeal. The District Court'sfindings and 
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conclusions of law concerning Monumental's"best efforts" 
are convincing, and we are satisfied that they would not 
reasonably be affected by the evidence Agency offers. Had 
the extrinsic evidence been admitted, Monumental would in 
all probability have responded that it never would have 
agreed to be forced to market to all CGA members, 
regardless of the losses in so doing, the absence of their 
insurability and eligibility, especially when its goal was to 
recoup funds from Agency and the Pegulas. 
 
Even if Agency's proposed evidence was taken as true 
and unrebutted, the District Court could have r easonably 
concluded that Monumental exercised "best ef forts" 
because nothing Agency offered suggests that Monumental 
was bound to make repeated losing investments in 
marketing plans. For Agency's theory to prevail, we must 
believe that Monumental bound itself to make r epeated 
unprofitable marketing expenditures-- from paying inflated 
advertising rates in the CGA magazine to marketing to CGA 
members for whom Monumental offered no pr oducts or 
from whom Monumental would obtain little, if any, profit. 
In light of Monumental's goal to recoup the mor e than $8 
million owing to it by Agency, such a conclusion is illogical. 
If Agency's contentions were true, it should have appeared 
in the text of the Agreement; it did not. W e see no abuse of 
discretion by the district judge in excluding Agency's 
evidence. 
 
C. Recusal 
 
Agency argues that the district judge imper missibly failed 
to notify counsel of his relationship with Monumental's law 
firm, and failed to disqualify himself under 28 U.S.C. 
S 455(e).7 The district judge disqualified himself in the CGA 
action, but purportedly failed to offer his disqualification in 
the instant action. Agency claims that the district judge's 
failure to offer the same disqualification in this action 
constituted reversible error. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. 28 U.S.C. S 455(a) states that "[a]ny . . . judge . . . of the United 
States 
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. S 455(e) provides that "waiver may 
be accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of 
the basis for disqualification." 
 
                                18 
  
In reviewing Agency's contention on appeal that the 
District Court improperly denied its motion for recusal, it is 
appropriate that we view this motion in its pr oper 
perspective. Agency alleges no conflict of inter est on the 
part of the judge; indisputably, there is none. Agency, even 
after a lengthy an arduous trial, asserts no bias or 
prejudice of the judge, and, on appeal, challenges none of 
the judge's 231 findings of fact. Although this pr oceeding 
followed on the heels of the earlier and related CGA case, 
Agency made no motion for recusal befor e trial. 
 
Notwithstanding that all of these considerations suggest 
that plaintiff 's motion is a desperate ef fort to overturn an 
adverse decision, Agency argues that its motion for recusal 
deserves favorable consideration because Judge V anaskie 
sua sponte offered to recuse himself in the prior CGA trial 
because of his former relationship with the Dilworth firm. 
The implication of that argument is that the judge must a 
fortiori recuse himself in this case. 
 
Although the judge offered to recuse himself in the CGA 
action, he did so out of excess caution. The only applicable 
section of the recusal statute under the cir cumstances is 
28 U.S.C. S 455(a) which, at the same time, sets forth the 
pertinent standard of review: "Any . . . judge . . . of the 
United States, shall disqualify himself in any pr oceeding in 
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." See 
also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994); 
Massachusetts School of Law at Andover v. American Bar 
Assoc., 107 F.3d 1026, 1042 (3d Cir . 1997). By the time the 
judge issued his findings of fact and conclusions of law, six 
years had elapsed since his resignation fr om the Dilworth 
firm. There were no circumstances showing any lingering, 
disqualifying relationship and nothing to suggest to any 
reasonable person an appearance of impartiality. His 
unnecessary and even improvident disqualification in the 
CGA was a matter of record, as was the waiver. 
Furthermore, Judge Vanaskie's history of previous 
employment and partnership in the Dilworth fir m had been 
published in his profile contained, since his elevation to the 
Court, in Volume C of Justices and Judges of the United 
States Courts. 
 
                                19 
  
Agency's argument, when distilled, amounts to nothing 
more than a whisper that the judge's participation in this 
trial, in light of his prior recusal, has an appearance of 
impartiality. It certainly had no such appearance to Agency, 
an intensely interested party, because it claims it knew 
nothing of the prior recusal until after this trial, although 
it is hardly possible to accept such a r epresentation in light 
of the circumstances pertaining to the CGA litigation. 
 
These circumstances reveal that the judge had strong 
reason to believe that Agency, Pegula, and CGA were so 
intertwined that his conditional disqualification on the 
record in CGA was known to the principals in this action. 
Close study of the record reveals that CGA, Agency, 
Management, and Pegula had significant cross-over in their 
business, management, and staffing. Pegula and his 
daughter are the primary conduit in this cr oss-over. As 
Agency's counsel admitted at oral argument, CGA has no 
employees of its own. Although CGA has a Boar d of 
Directors and attorneys, it executes its Board's commands 
through Management (i.e., Pegula). Ther efore, the district 
judge's conditional disqualification in CGA  must be treated 
as having been known and waived by Agency, which is also 
controlled and owned by Pegula. Pegula will not be 
permitted to hide behind corporate for ms to assert lack of 
knowledge or notice. Agency's argument that neither it nor 
its counsel knew of the prior CGA disqualification was not 
convincing to the District Court, nor to us. 
 
We also believe that there must be a mor e compelling 
standard for recusal under S 455(a) after the conclusion of 
a trial than before its inception. After a massive proceeding 
such as this, when the court has invested substantial 
judicial resources and there is indisputably no evidence of 
prejudice, a motion for recusal of a trial judge should be 
supported by substantial justification, not fanciful illusion. 
See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 160 F.3d 231, 235 (5th 
Cir. 1998); Summers v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 917, 920 (11th 
Cir. 1997). 
 
Support for our ruling can be found in the r ecent case of 
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 1221 S. Ct. 25 (2000), 
where the Chief Justice declined to recuse himself from 
participating in an appeal in an antitrust action even 
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though his son then represented Micr osoft in separate 
antitrust actions. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 121 
S.Ct. 25 (2000). The Chief Justice "[did] not believe that a 
well-informed individual would conclude that an 
appearance of impropriety exists simply because[his] son 
represents, in another case, a party that is also a party to 
litigation pending in [the Supreme Court]." Id. at 26. In the 
instant matter, the relationship between the trial judge and 
the Dilworth firm had terminated several years before the 
case commenced; there was no blood relationship between 
the trial judge and anyone in the Dilworth fir m; there is no 
claim of any bias by the trial judge; and the trial has been 
concluded. We see no error in the District Court's refusal to 
grant the motion. 
 
D. Wilful Nonfeasance 
 
Monumental General Insurance Group, Inc. cr oss- 
appeals the District Court's reconsider ed finding that the 
Pegulas did not commit wilful nonfeasance in ceasing their 
performance under the Agreement. 
 
Section 5.03 of the Agreement conditionally r elieved 
Pegula and Barbara Pegula from personal liability for the 
restructured loan: 
 
       Pegula shall have no personal liability whatsoever with 
       regard to payment of the loan balances. Excepted from 
       the foregoing is the right to prosecute Pegula in the 
       event of fraud, wilful or wanton misfeasance, 
       malfeasance or nonfeasance or in the event of 
       deliberate subversion by Pegula of the intent of this 
       Agreement which is for Agency and Management to 
       increase CGA memberships, for [Monumental] to 
       market and sell insurance programs to CGA members 
       . . . . 
 
Pegula ceased marketing new CGA memberships in 1995 
and never resumed; Monumental asserts that this was 
wilful nonfeasance. Pegula argues that his nonfeasance was 
not wilful, and that he was justified in his action because 
he bona fidely believed that Monumental br eached the 
Agreement by failing to exercise "good faith." 
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       1. Procedural Challenge 
 
Monumental first raises a procedural challenge to the 
District Court's reconsideration of the personal liability 
issue. Only Agency filed timely post-trial motions under 
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 52 and 59; the Pegulas neverfiled such 
a motion. However, Agency's motion raised the Pegulas' 
successful request for reconsideration. See Appx. 97 n.1 
(District Court's reconsideration memorandum stating 
"Although the motions were filed only on behalf of Agency, 
they will be construed as having been filed on behalf of 
Agency, Management and the Pegulas.") Monumental 
argues that the effect of construing Agency's Rule 52 and 
Rule 59 motions as filed by the Pegulas impr operly 
extended the time for reconsidering the December 8, 1998 
Order. 
 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 59 have strict 10 
day time limits that cannot be expanded by the District 
Court. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 6(b). A court is constrained to 
reconsider its rulings within the time limits provided by 
Rules 52 and 59. See Fed. R. Civ. Pr oc. 6(b). In Hertz Corp. 
v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 16 F.3d 1126, 1128 (11th Cir. 
1994), the court held that a co-defendant's filing of timely 
motion to amend judgment did not excuse another 
defendant from the ten-day time limit for filing motion to 
amend judgment. 
 
Agency's post-trial motions clearly raised the Pegulas' 
arguments for reconsideration. Agency's proposed orders 
also purportedly included the Pegulas' desir ed outcome. 
Monumental did not suffer lack of notice. Unlike Hertz, 
both the motion and supporting memorandum specifically 
requested relief on behalf of the Pegulas individually, and 
the District Court treated the motion as having been filed 
on behalf of the Pegulas as well as Agency and CGA. Under 
these circumstances, we do not believe it was impermissible 
for the District Court to consider Pegula's ar guments for 
reconsideration. 
 
Monumental is incorrect that the District Court extended 
the time within which the Pegulas could file a post-trial 
motion for reconsideration. The Pegulas never made a late 
filing; Agency's timely filing also included the Pegulas. The 
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District Court and Monumental were always on notice that 
the Pegulas' interests were tied with Agency's, and it was 
clear to all concerned that the Pegulas' inter ests were 
advocated in Agency's post-trial submissions. W e see no 
error in the District Court's treatment of the Agency's 
motions as also filed on behalf of the Pegulas. 
 
       2. Merits 
 
In its December 8, 1998 opinion, the District Court, 
reasoning that Pegula wilfully refused to perform under the 
Agreement, attached personal liability to Pegula and his 
wife under S5.3 of the Agreement.8  On reconsideration, the 
District Court, relying on a new hearing and a new analysis 
of the definition of "wilful," held that wilfulness requires an 
element of fault or culpability -- more than the mere 
occurrence of an act. Pegula genuinely thought there was 
legal justification for his failure to comply under the 
Agreement. The District Court therefor e held on 
reconsideration that Pegula had not committed a wilful act 
in violation of S 5.03. In so doing, the District Court also 
credited Pegula's justification for his actions -- that literally 
complying with the Agreement would have wr ought 
financial havoc because it was impossible for his Agency to 
recoup the projected marketing expenditur es. 
 
This issue turns on whether "wilful" r equires 
consciousness of fault or culpability, or whether it requires 
the performance of an act. We exercise plenary review of 
the District Court's interpretation of the Agr eement. 
Monumental argues that a decision not to per form a 
contractual duty, made deliberately, constitutes wilful 
nonfeasance under the Agreement. Pegula counters with 
the assertion that wilful nonfeasance requir es a heightened 
level of ill will beyond a failure to act, and that he never 
wilfully ceased performance. Pegula also argues that even if 
he wilfully ceased performance, he was justified in doing it. 
 
Pennsylvania law does not provide a consistent definition 
of "wilful." Even Black's Law Dictionary pr ovides two 
definitions: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The District Court found that Pegula did not act wantonly in his 
refusal to perform. 
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       Willful. Proceeding from a conscious motion of the will; 
       voluntary; knowingly; deliberate. Intending the r esult 
       which actually comes to pass; designed; intentional; 
       purposeful; not accidental or involuntary. [Monumental 
       wins under this phrasing. But the definition 
       continues:] 
 
       Premeditated; malicious; done with evil intent, or with 
       a bad motive or purpose, or with indiffer ence to the 
       natural consequences; unlawful; without legal 
       justification. [Pegula wins under this phrasing.] 
 
Black's Law Dictionary 1599 (6th ed. 1990). The District 
Court cited Evans v. Philadelphia Trans. Co., 212 A.2d 440 
(Pa. 1965) (tort case); Dudley v. USX Corp., 606 A.2d 916 
(Pa. Super. 1992) (tort case); and Edmondson v. Zetusky, 
674 A.2d 760, 767 (Pa. Cwth. Ct. 1996) (tort case). All of 
these cases used the definition of wilful misconduct 
entailing mal intent. We must determine, however, whether 
Pegula committed wilful nonfeasance under a contract that 
also specifies liability for wanton nonfeasance. W ilful 
nonfeasance must be distinct from wanton nonfeasance, or 
else both terms would not be stated in the same section of 
the Agreement. Wanton is defined as r eckless, heedless, 
malicious, and unruly. See Black's Law Dictionary 1582 
(6th ed. 1990). Interestingly, Black's definition of wanton 
includes "willful and malicious." Id. The District Court 
relied on In re Jury Estate, 112 A.2d 634 (1955), a case 
concerning whether a spouse willfully failed to support his 
deceased wife. Jury Estate ruled that "willful" implied 
consciousness of fault. 
 
The Agreement before us contemplates thr ee levels of 
nonfeasance: plain nonfeasance, willful nonfeasance, and 
wanton nonfeasance. Only willful nonfeasance and wanton 
nonfeasance trigger the Pegulas' personal liability under 
S 5.03. Nonfeasance is the nonperfor mance of some act that 
a person is obligated or has responsibility to perform. See 
Black's Law Dictionary 1054 (6th ed. 1990). For wilful 
nonfeasance to be distinct from nonfeasance, an additional 
element of mental state must be present -- an evil intent. 
Wanton nonfeasance entails a further heightened mens rea 
-- that of reckless, unruly failure to perform an obligation. 
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George Pegula's conduct was nonfeasance; ther e is no 
evidence that he had improper motive or evil intent in 
failing to conduct marketing activities in 1995 and beyond. 
When Pegula breached his obligations under the 
Agreement, he had lost a significant amount of money 
during the prior year, and he had a good faith belief that 
Monumental had already breached the obligations under 
the Agreement. Pegula's attorney advised him that he was 
justified in ceasing performance because of Monumental's 
perceived breach. Pegula may have been guided by the 
principle that a breaching party cannot stop performance 
and continue taking advantage of a contract's benefits. See 
S&R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int'l., Inc., 968 F.2d 371, 375 (3d 
Cir. 1992). Pegula believed he was excused fr om 
performance because, in his view, Monumental had 
breached the contract, and this released him from 
continued performance. 
 
The District Court justifiably reconsider ed its earlier 
decision as to Pegula. The Court committed no r eversible 
error by concluding on further consideration that Pegula 
did not commit willful nonfeasance. 
 
III. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated her ein, the judgment 
in favor of Monumental entered on December 8, 1998 and 
the order denying the motion for recusal entered on March 
9, 1999, will be affirmed. Likewise, the judgment entered 
on January 25, 2000 granting the Pegulas' request for 
reconsideration will be affirmed. Each side will bear its own 
costs. 
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